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Introduction
Machine learning is a form of knowledge production native to the era of big data. It is at the core of 
social media platforms and everyday interactions. It is also being rapidly adopted for research and 
discovery across academia, business and government. This paper will explore the way the 
affordances of machine learning itself, and the forms of social apparatus that it becomes a part of, 
will potentially erode ethics and draw us in to a drone-like perspective. Unconstrained machine 
learning enables and delimits our knowledge of the world in particular ways: the abstractions and 
operations of machine learning produce a ‘view from above’ whose consequences for both ethics 
and legality parallel the dilemmas of drone warfare. The family of machine learning methods is not 
somehow inherently bad or dangerous, nor does implementing them signal any intent to cause harm.
Nevertheless, the machine learning assemblage produces a targeting gaze whose algorithms 
obfuscate the legality of its judgements, and whose iterations threaten to create both specific 
injustices and broader states of exception. Given the urgent need to provide some kind of balance 
before machine learning becomes embedded everywhere, this paper proposes people’s councils as a 
way to contest machinic judgements and reassert openness and discourse.
Machine Learning
Machine learning is becoming a methodological substrate for knowledge and action. But machine 
learning is not ethically neutral. It is skewed by data and obfuscated by nature, and these 
characteristics are particularly strong in the most successful kind of machine learning (neural 
networks). To grapple with the ways a set of computational methods can have ethical implications it
is important to understand something of the actual workings of the algorithms (Geitgey, 2014). 
Looking at mathematical minimisation, decision boundaries and the role of data in the production of
prediction, we can appreciate how machine learning is becoming a kind of dark matter that invisibly
distorts the distribution of benefits and harm.  
Such is the sometimes uncanny ability of machine learning to participate in activities previously 
considered uniquely human, such as playing chess or Go (Silver et al., 2016), that it seems to fulfill 
the original conception of artificial intelligence (AI) “to find how to make machines use language, 
form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved for humans, and improve 
themselves” (Kline, 2010). However, machine learning is nothing like the emergent general 
intelligence that characterises cultural representations of AI, and is instead a set of mathematical 
methods that can perform amazing yet utterly thoughtless feats of classification. The mode of 
operation of machine learning is to ‘learn’; that is, when supplied with a large amount of input data 
and a corresponding set of targets it finds a function to map the features of the input data to the 
desired target outputs. Machine learning finds reproducible patterns in the data. Moreover, these 
patterns have predictive power in that they can predict the target value for new and unknown input. 
Thus machine learning is a form of numerical pattern finding with predictive power, prompting 
comparisons with science. But rather than being universal and objective it produces knowledge that 
is irrevocably entangled with specific computational mechanisms and the data used for the training. 
The data used for training the algorithms is associated with a set of known labels or outcomes 
which are called the targets. The input features are weighted to optimise the function that maps the 
input to those targets. Imagine, for example, a training set consisting of clusters of green dots and 
red dots. They may represent the results of an MRI scan for cancer and the corresponding actual 
diagnosis (red or green), with the axes of the chart being the size and density of the observed 
tumour, and the green dots representing cases where the tumour was found to be non-malignant. 
The algorithm is fed the size and density of the tumours and told the target label of red or green in 
each case. Its task is to find a plausible decision boundary between them i.e. a line that separates the
two kinds of dot and which can be used to classify future data points based on which side of the line
they fall on. It's not an easy task because the boundary is not neat and the dots tend to mingle a bit. 
Mathematically, the algorithm calculates a cost function, which is a quantity representing how far 
each predicted result is away from the actual diagnosis for a given fit of the parameters. The power 
of machine learning comes from the iterative minimisation of this cost, such that the final fit works 
as well as possible across all the training data (Schutt & O’Neil, 2013). Thus, a humanly 
meaningful question (‘is this tumour malignant?’) is converted to an operation that computers are 
good at -- thousands and thousands of rapid and repetitive calculations. In the case of our dots, a 
well-chosen machine learning algorithm will find a boundary that makes the best job of dividing the
positive and negative test results. There will always be false positives (classified as malignant, but 
not) and false negatives (malignant cases that are mis-classified) but the aim is to get a model that is
statistically successful and can be applied to future test results. 
The only thing that the machine learning knows about the world is the data that is fed to it. In one 
sense this accounts for its power, in that any problem which can be cast in a suitable numerical form
can be tackled by the general family of machine learning algorithms. For the purposes of the 
mathematical minimisation, it doesn't matter whether the data represents house prices or terrorism 
suspects. Anything, in principle, can be ‘data scienced’. However this is also an Achilles heel. With 
the input data we sweep in all the potential biases that lie behind its construction as data in the first 
instance. If the data is distorted by social prejudice then that is the pattern that the algorithm will 
learn (Lee, 2016). We have only to consider for a moment the way that algorithms powering 
predictive policing systems are trained on historical arrest and crime data and thus accumulate all 
the individual and cultural decisions about who to target for investigation and arrest. If there is 
discrimination embedded in the data then our machines will come to think our prejudices for us. If 
those machinic judgements are then used to target future activity, we have the technological 
reproduction of social discrimination (Brayne, 2017). The problem goes beyond straightforward 
racism or sexism, as data also inherits its ontology i.e. what gets constructed or counted as 
meaningful data depends on the worldview and assumptions of those defining the data (Boellstorff, 
2013; Gitelman, 2012) - for example, whether depression is classified through biomedical 
symptoms or through people’s experiences. 
Machine learning brings with it another characteristic which can cause or obscure harm, which is 
the opaque nature of its decision making. As has been pointed out, machine learning depends on big
data because the training set needs to be large enough to generate a useful predictive model. The 
features used by the algorithm are the different quantified aspects of the input which can be used to 
help find a pattern. It is not uncommon for the number of features to be in the hundreds or 
thousands. The methods also excel at finding patterns across diverse data by finding distant 
correlations that boost their predictive power. The more mixed the data the more options the 
algorithm has for weightings that optimise the overall fit. However, it can be hard to reverse this 
process in to human reasoning (Lipton, 2016). While in many cases the outcome is interpretable 
because the correlations seem to make some kind of sense, this is a form of post-hoc rationalisation.
Based on our own experience, for example, it wouldn’t surprise us that emails mentioning an 
unexpected lottery win and using terms like ‘urgent’ and ‘money transfer’ would be algorithmically 
classified as spam (Burrell, 2016), but the machine doesn’t think that way because it doesn’t think 
at all. It simply minimises a function applied over the whole input data set (in this case, bags of 
words extracted from emails) by carrying out thousands of matrix calculations very quickly. 
The whole point about big data analytics is that the number and form of calculations that need to be 
carried out exceed the scale and complexity which people can comprehend directly. Otherwise there
would be no need for the algorithms and there would be nothing new in the predictive potential of 
data science. There is no larger explanatory structure to fall back on because the outcomes are based
on large scale correlations, not on logical causation. Thus there is no cumulative support for the 
proposed explanation from other non-falsified hypotheses, as there is in the physical sciences. 
While the operators of the algorithms may develop intuitions for what will work better in a specific 
case and why, and the outcomes are tested on known data and parameterised in terms of their 
accuracy, there is an opacity at the heart of the methods. If we can't understand exactly what is 
being weighed in the balance, it is very hard to tell under what circumstances harm may be caused 
or in what ways the operations might be unethical. 
The particular form of machine learning that is currently achieving spectacular success and 
dominating the popular narrative about artificial intelligence is neural networks, also known as deep
learning. Significantly for any discussion of ethics, neural networks are also the hardest to interpret 
in ways that make sense to people. To understand the impressive power of deep learning we can 
consider the task of recognising faces. While we might guess that computer vision would work 
adequately with the rigid and predictable pose of the passport photo, we have tended to think that 
recognising someone’s face under different conditions of lighting, distance and angle, or even when 
the person has aged, is a uniquely human ability. A data set that has been used to test this 
assumption is known as Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW), which consists of more than thirteen 
thousand images of well-known faces collected from the web. Like a giant tabloid newspaper it 
consists of multiple close up photos of these famous people under all sorts of conditions. The rates 
of human performance on the LFW data is excellent, as we might expect, with recognition rates of 
between 97.53% and 99.20%. But in a paper from 2015 a team from Google presented a deep 
learning system called FaceNet which achieved a record accuracy on LFW of 99.63% (Schroff, 
Kalenichenko, & Philbin, 2015). In other words, the algorithm is better at recognising faces than 
people are, which is somewhat uncanny. Similar leaps are being made or anticipated in many other 
areas. The core ethical problem behind this new superpower is that we can’t really tell how neural 
networks come to their conclusions, which makes it very hard to know whether they are ‘doing the 
right thing’ or likely to cause harm to persons at some point. 
While functioning neural networks have been around since 1958 (Rosenblatt, 1958) they are very 
much back in fashion because of their traction with messy, hard to parameterise problems like 
computer vision, speech recognition and self-driving cars. Their great leap forward comes from a 
combination of vast training datasets, courtesy of social media and our digitised lifeworld, and the 
availability of computer chips called graphic processing units (GPUs) that were originally 
developed for gaming but turn out to be very effective at the large matrix calculations because high 
quality 3D graphics have very similar requirements for massively parallel processing. The deep 
learning algorithm itself consists of different layers of nodes (or ‘neurons’); each node is connected 
to all the nodes in the subsequent layers, all the way through to the final target layer. The cost 
function applies differing weights to these node-to-node connections. Training is carried out by the 
massively parallel process of ‘back propagation’; the gap between the prediction and the target 
values is fed back to neurons in the final layer, which makes a set of corrections and feeds them 
back to the layer before that, and so on (Nielsen, 2015). The process resembles a shuttle weaving 
connections across the threads on a steam-powered loom. There is no feature selection by the 
human operator (as there was in our tumour example, where size and density were the chosen 
features); the layers are force fed the input data and develop their own features through the 
weightings of connections between nodes. This is not a black box process; we can access the values 
of these weightings. The sometimes insurmountable challenge is to try to interpret these weightings 
in a way that is  accessible to human reasoning. While we can form an intuition about some kinds of
mathematics (such as the force, mass and acceleration in Newton’s second law F = ma) it can be 
hard to reverse the results of massively parallel minimisation in to a representational model of the 
external world. The results can be evaluated for accuracy by applying them to a new set of labelled 
test data, but calculating the number of false positives (i.e. data points that are wrongly classified) 
tells us nothing about the internal reasoning of the algorithm. Thus, deep learning transforms messy 
data at scale into testable predictions but sabotages the kind of questions we need to ask when 
assessing its ethical impact. 
The predictive nature of machine learning promotes preemption, i.e. action that attempts to 
anticipate or prevent the predicted outcome. In a world overflowing with data, machine learning and
deep learning are powerfully attractive. For any context where a lot is riding on uncertain outcomes,
the lure of being able to peer through the fog of data and read off the probable future through 
computational pattern analysis comes to be almost irresistible. At the current time, it would be hard 
to think of an area of life that isn’t under consideration for treatment by algorithmic methods. Some 
large companies analyse their organisational data this way to try to predict which employees are 
most likely to be next to leave (Silverman & Waller, 2015) while universities experiment with 
systems that predict which students are at high risk of failing a course. In Australia, the Security 
Risk Assessment Tool automatically determines the risk category of everyone being held in 
immigration detention centres, and decides whether they should be in manacles when they go for a 
hospital appointment (Bagshaw & Koziol, 2017). In the USA, the adoption of predictive policing 
systems like Predpol is becoming quite commonplace (PredPol, 2015). Both governments and 
private enterprise are developing algorithms to predict which parents are most likely to abuse their 
children (Keddell, 2015; Brown, 2016). Even in this small subset of examples it is easy to imagine 
the risk of possible harm arising from interventions based on the algorithmic predictions. 
As we have seen, machine learning is unlike the AI vision propagated by science fiction films like 
Blade Runner or the ‘existential threat’ invoked by Silicon Valley entrepreneur Elon Musk 
(Domonoske, 2017). It is a mode of calculative knowing that operates at the level of methodology 
and infrastructure as it classifies, makes predictions and constitutes its subjects. By its nature, 
machine learning is not generally visible to us; it is what happens to our data somewhere out of 
sight, after human actions have generated this data and prior to the social interactions that are 
shaped by its verdicts. This doesn’t lessen the impact that it will increasingly come to have. The 
effect of machine learning embedded in methodologies and institutions will be of a kind of dark 
matter, invisible in itself but pulling other systems into new shapes around it. The methods of 
machine learning will bring to many areas of social enquiry a science-like power to predict and a 
political opportunity to preempt. But the opportunity to operate these methods ethically is 
obfuscated by the machinery itself. By absorbing the latent content of our data and basing insights 
on opaque and possibly non-interpretable ‘learning’ the algorithms become actors that make ethical 
decisions for us in ways that are hard to challenge. We are approaching the machinic production of 
ethics. 
Machinic Production of Ethics
The usurping of ethical agency by machine learning can be explained by looking at the ways that 
the affordances of machine learning erode consent and the avoidance of harm, and impact notions 
of justice and due process. The flow of data through the code produces classifications and 
inferences, affects how people are treated, and opens up future possibilities of unintended 
consequences (Markham, 2017). More, machine learning dismantles the ‘human subject’ as a useful
concept for ethical treatment and reconstitutes it instead as means of targeting. 
Recent studies provide strong evidence that machine learning models can also absorb 
discrimination, which is then perpetuated by their predictions. For example, word embedding is a 
method to represent text data as vectors and is used in many machine learning and natural language 
processing tasks. These vectors are sets of numbers that capture the semantic relationships between 
words (Colyer, 2016). A recent study of the word embeddings in Google’s widely used Word2vec, 
derived by a neural network from a Google news corpus of three million words, shows that it is 
intransigently sexist. For example, querying it for the word that satisfies the relationship ‘man is to 
doctor as woman is to x’ returns ‘nurse’, while ‘man is to computer programmer as woman is to x’ 
gives x as ‘homemaker’ (Bolukbasi et al, 2016). 
The Tuskegee syphilis experiment highlights the dangers of embedded discrimination. The 
untreated progression of syphilis in African-American men in rural Alabama was studied over 
decades while the men were deceived in to believing they were receiving free health care and 
treatments. Begun in the 1930s, the experiment was allowed to run for forty years before a 
whistleblower made it public in 1972 and public outrage closed it down (Brandt, 1978). Partly as a 
result of the Tuskegee experiment the US government established the Office for Human Research 
Protections and set up Institutional Review Boards to vet research proposals in universities and 
hospitals (Office for Human Research Protections, 2009).  
However, algorithmic methods escape oversight when the abstraction inherent in machine learning 
make it seem that there is no direct relationship to human subjects. The vast majority of academic 
research on machine learning and neural networks is not seen as requiring ethics review. Even 
where the data has been generated by or about some aspect of people’s lives, the apparent distance 
of the data point from the human or the fact that it is ‘already public’ or covered by some Terms of 
Service not only makes it difficult to see it as having ethical problems (what Markham & Buchanan 
call the ‘distance principle’, 2016), but also puts it outside the purview of most Institutional Review 
Boards (Leetaru, 2016). But, as we shall see, the reconstitution of the distant subject as target is part
of the ethical impact of machine learning. 
Machine learning is only effective when the training data sets are large enough. The ethical question
of consent is marginalised by this need for scale. Moreover, big data analytics benefit from using 
heterogeneous sources; the pattern finding mechanisms excel at finding correlations across not only 
vast but also varied sets of data. Payday loans companies like Wonga claim to use hundreds 
different data points varying from mouse click patterns to social media friendships to make rapid 
algorithmic lending decisions (Morozov, 2013). It is impossible to know in advance what purposes 
particular data will eventually be put to, and whether that will cause harm. One thing that we can 
say with reasonable certainty is that the unconstrained application of machine learning will impact 
our notions of justice. In particular, the preemptive interventions that flow from predictive machine 
learning run counter to due process. While the basis of most extant legal systems is 'presumed 
innocent until proven guilty', it is a principle that is bypassed by the operation of algorithmic 
prediction. "Big data enables a universalizable strategy of preemptive social decisionmaking. Such 
a strategy renders individuals unable to observe, understand, participate in, or respond to 
information gathered or assumptions made about them. When one considers that big data can be 
used to make important decisions that implicate us without our even knowing it, preemptive social 
decision making is antithetical to privacy and due process values." (Earle & Kerr, 2013). 
These same methods are also productive of the situations that Miranda Fricker calls 'epistemic 
injustice'. One kind of epistemic injustice is testimonial injustice, where prejudices cause people to 
"give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word" (Fricker, 2007). In a world where the 
production of knowledge and truth is increasingly deferred to algorithms, mathematical predictions 
may be given a higher weight that the subject's own version of events, were that even to be sought 
in the first place. The other kind of epistemic injustice is hermeneutical injustice, "a kind of 
injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower". Fricker points to 
this as the kind of injustice experienced by social groups who lack the resources to make sense of 
their own experience. 
In the world of big data the set of social groups whose life patterns will be authoritatively 
interpreted by distant machines is growing ever larger, including those at the sharp end of social 
provision such as ‘troubled families’ (Portal Analytics, 2017). Not only do the methods affect 
justice in a general sense, they are also being increasingly applied in direct juridical contexts. The 
dispute between nonprofit investigative journalism organisation ProPublica and Northpointe, the 
company whose software assigns risk scores to defendents awaiting trial (and thus influences 
whether they are released on bail) is a case in point. Northpointe say that their algorithm is fair and 
not racist because defendents given a risk score of seven have the same likelihood of reoffending 
(60 percent of white defendants and 61 percent of black defendants). ProPublica point to the 
unfairness that among defendants who ultimately did not reoffend, blacks were more than twice as 
likely as whites to be classified as medium or high risk (42 percent vs. 22 percent) (Corbett-Davies, 
Pierson, Feller, & Goel, 2016), meaning that they receive harsher pre-trial bail conditions. It is 
mathematically impossible for a machine learning algorithm to achieve both types of fairness in a 
situation where the re-arrest rate for black defendents is higher, which links in turn to the likelihood 
of heavier policing in black neighbourhoods and the possibility of bias in the decision to make an 
arrest. It is becoming apparent that the questions of fairness and justice that are entangled with 
computational methods are unsolvable at the level of the machinic methods themselves. 
The form in which machine learning reconstitutes its human subjects is central to understanding the 
collateral damage to ethics. When dealing with internet and our digitalised lifeworld the tendency is
to consider human subjects when the data is collected directly from people through some online 
interaction, but not when working with points that were collected from the general firehose of social
and infrastructural data. This is obviously questionable in terms of privacy, given the number of 
times since the AOL search query release of 2006 (Barbaro & Jr, 2006) that ‘anonymous’ internet 
data turns out to have potentially harmful impacts on individuals. The emergence of big data has 
fuelled the debate about the centrality of human subjects to ethical assessments (Metcalf & 
Crawford, 2016). 
Machine learning reverses the trajectory of data’s journey away from its individual point of origin. 
It absorbs all manner of diverse and apparently insignificant data, all the way down to the level of 
single words and pixels, and uses these to target specific categories of subjects or to detect those 
who are anomalous to normative patterns. The raw material of this process corresponds to 
Deleuze’s notion of ‘dividuals’ in that we are not working with whole human subjects but digitised 
fragments and moments: “We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. 
Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ and masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (Deleuze, 
1992).  
Deleuze was writing in relation to ‘societies of control’ as the successor form to Foucault’s 
disciplinary society. Disciplinary societies are constructed around a relationship between the 
individual and the mass, whereas societies of control are articulated through the dyad of dividuals 
and databases.  Rather than incarcerating individuals, the focus of control is on processes operating 
continuously across the space of social interactions.  On this basis it may seem like machine 
learning will manifest as another iteration of the society of control, but that does not adequately 
account for its algorithmic gaze.  
The wide-area view of machine learning hovers high above the flow of data, attempting to force fit 
the snippets of information in to patterns that represent its target.  In the higher dimensional space 
of the computer's model we reappear as pathways, as vectors pointing in a particular, predictive 
direction. Not individuals as such, but not simply fragments of data aggregated by a database query,
the subject is woven in to a silhouette perceptible by the machine.  As Gregoire Chamayou puts it, 
"The production of this form of individuality belongs neither to discipline nor to control, but to 
something else: to targeting in its most contemporary procedures, whose formal features are shared 
today among fields as diverse as policing, military reconnaissance and marketing. It might well be, 
for that matter, that we are entering targeted societies" (Chamayou, 2014).
The Drone Perspective
The transformation of analog experience into data is a process of abstraction, which carries its own 
problems (Markham, 2013). Machine learning elevates abstraction (Wing, 2008) to an ethos, an 
orientation to everyday life. While the knowledge produced by machine learning is drawn from 
correlations rather than causations, it can appear to reveal a hidden mathematical order in the world 
that is superior to our direct experience (McQuillan, 2017). By seeming to promise an objective 
mathematised view based on hard data it resembles the scientific standpoint, the ‘view from above’ 
that is founded on a disembodied claim to a universal as well as objective knowledge (Haraway, 
1988). The assumption of this privileged knowledge serves to justify intervention. The algorithmic 
eye stays permanently on station, each data point contributing to a panoramic view of its milieu, its 
models fitting observed activity in to the patterns it has been tasked with targeting in a way that is 
perceived as objective, as expressive of a higher order of knowing.  
Machine learning, as a method of algorithmic targeting that has ethical consequences, risks 
inducing a drone perspective on the world. The drone perspective combines a privileged view from 
above with interventions of dubious legality. As with military drones, it is an orientation to action 
based only on patterns, whose determinations become self-justifying. The actual drone operations of
the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) are frequently based on ‘pattern of life analysis’,
a term that describes the accrual over time of observations, signals intelligence and social media 
data that reveal distinctive patterns in a subject’s life. These that are then compared with signatures 
of activity that would justify a strike (U. S. Joint Forces Command, 2012).  Drones are targeted to 
carry out signature strikes based on a target's patterns of behavior but without knowing that target's 
identity (Shane, 2015), sometimes killing militants but often killing civilians (Gregory, 2012). The 
legality of any of these targeted strikes is deeply disputed as the policy appears to violate both 
international humanitarian law (the ‘laws of war’) and international human rights. The former head 
of the International Legal Division of the Israeli Military Advocate General's Office justified 
targeted drone killings on the basis that "If you do something for long enough, the world will accept
it. The whole of international law is now based on the notion that an act that is forbidden today 
becomes permissible if executed by enough countries... International law progresses through 
violations" (Feldman, 2009). Without urgent attention to the ethical challenges, the social 
interventions of machine learning will also tend to normalise actions of ambiguous legality. The 
models will iterate over the injustices embedded in their training data while potentially adding more
through their own opacity. This construction of targets forestalls discourse, explanation or the 
judgement of peers.
The notion of algorithmic governance (Rouvroy, 2013) is changing from a topic of philosophical 
speculation to something that we will have to wrestle with on a day to day basis. The allure of big 
data (the ‘new oil’), the promise of smart infrastructures, and the post-austerity drive for large scale 
efficiencies and cost-savings makes algorithmic decision a default option for government. For 
example, Australian social security law states that “A decision made by the operation of a computer 
program under an arrangement made under subsection (1) is taken to be a decision made by the 
Secretary” (Elvery, 2017). Under this legislation, the Centrelink ‘robodebt’ algorithm has made 
decisions about overpayment of welfare benefits that resulted in debts being raised against 
thousands of individuals. While it has become clear that these algorithmic signature strikes often 
make mistakes, the burden of proof has been shifted onto the claimants to dispute it in each case 
while, in the meantime, they must pay off the debt or risk imprisonment. 
Living under the gaze of the drone is to live in a ‘state of exception’ (Saif, 2016). The state of 
exception, as discussed by Giorgio Agamben, is a situation where law, rights and political meaning 
to life are suspended. It is the reduction of citizens to ‘bare life’  - a biological existence without 
civic existence (Agamben, 2005). While the consequences of machine learning in research and 
practice will usually emerge at a more prosaic level, their operations share another characteristic 
with these extrajudicial spaces. Agamben describes the topological structure of the state of 
exception as 'being-outside and yet belonging', which is also a good description of the operations of 
machine learning as ethically ‘other’ within the knowledge or governance structures they inhabit. 
The effect of ethically dubious and extra-legal machine learning is likely to be the production of 
partial states of exception (McQuillan, 2015). When patterns of life are understood as expressive of 
personal decisions, the process of identifying target individuals and groups as making risky or 
irresponsible choices encodes a divisive discourse, an ‘us and them’ perspective that justifies 
exclusion. 
As can already be seen in current applications of big data analytics, algorithmic exclusion will be 
the calculative framework for the future of education (Selinger, 2015) and employment (Gee, 2017).
People will be excluded from opportunities without ever knowing why, or having a chance to 
contest it. Of course, the affordances of machine learning will also be embraced by explicit 
operations of exception. In July 2017, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) hosted
an ‘industry day’ for tech companies, seeking an overarching vetting machine ‘that automates, 
centralizes, and streamlines the current manual vetting process while simultaneously making 
determinations via automation if the data retrieved is actionable’ (Biddle & Woodman, 2017). The 
system must ‘determine and evaluate an applicant’s probability of becoming a positively 
contributing member of society’ and ‘predict whether an applicant intends to commit criminal or 
terrorist acts after entering the United States’. This also shows the breadth of data that is swept into 
AI analytics as, according to the slides from the ICE presentation, ‘The Contractor shall analyze and
apply techniques to exploit publically available information, such as media, blogs, public hearings, 
conferences, academic websites, social media websites such as Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn, 
radio, television, press, geospatial sources, internet sites, and specialized publications with intent to 
extract pertinent information regarding targets’. Under the targeting gaze of so-called AI, states of 
exception will move from the edges of social experience to the centre. 
People’s Councils
The ethical implications of an emerging drone perspective in the operations of machine learning 
demand an urgent response. This paper proposes that people’s councils provide a structure that 
counterbalances those aspects of machine learning that are toxic to ethics. While this is a 
speculative proposition, historical examples illustrate how people’s councils could restore collective
subjectivity and agency in the context of advanced technologies. It is suggested that the benefits of 
this approach also help tackle the imbalance between action and automaticity that make social 
machine learning problematic in the first place. 
Most of the discussions around the datafication of society focus on privacy, but the ethical problems
raised by machine learning are primarily issues of justice. The suppression of discourse and the 
inability to debate and contest the epistemology of the machines’ models challenges both rights and 
fairness. It may be that some amelioration is to be found at a technical level by setting an algorithm 
to catch an algorithm, in that the data used for training can be mangled by one operation of machine
learning to make sure that another can’t find within it any proxies for race, gender or other protected
category (Zemel et al, 2013). But trade-offs in fairness, such as those surfaced by the COMPAS 
parole system, can’t be resolved at the level of calculation and must instead be part of a values-led 
discussion. The drone perspective is not simply an algorithm but an apparatus, that is, a 
combination of tools, protocols and institutions. Ethical decision-making in a social setting is a 
deliberative process, best informed by a rich understanding of context that can only come through 
involving the subjects as participants. Countering the drone perspective, the distanced targeting 
from above, requires something radically democratic. 
The proposal here is that machine learning can be ethically reclaimed by combining it with the 
democratic structures of people’s councils. People’s councils are bottom-up, confederated structures
that act as direct democratic assemblies, based on the face-to-face democracy of the Athenian 
ekklesia (popular assemblies) (Ober, 1993). These forms of assembly are horizontal structures in 
which everyone has an equal say about the matter being decided. Setting up people’s councils for 
ethical machine learning means countering lack of consent with democratic consensus, replacing 
opacity with openness, and reintroducing the discourse that defines due process. The establishment 
of people’s councils in contexts where people are severely impacted by machinic decisions 
mobilises a distributed form of democracy as a way to contest distributed algorithmic governance. It
is likely that the councils operating on the same or similar topics (borders, education or social care, 
for example) would confederate; that is, form regional councils based on a system of recallable 
deputies (Biehl & Bookchin, 1997). The principle is to consciously adopt structures that reverse 
exclusion and exception. People’s councils are a refusal to be rendered as ‘dividuals’ or to be 
reconstituted as targets, and instead to collectively question and challenge decisions made by 
machines. Machine learning represents one of the highest historical forms of the abstraction of 
social relationships, and needs to be counterbalanced by the unmediated relationships of popular 
assemblies.
The histories of different forms of people’s councils offer insights into how and why we might use 
them to reintroduce ethics into machine learning. Take for example patients councils, a creation of 
the mental health users movement (Rogers & Pilgrim, 1991). In traditional psychiatric settings the 
‘patient’ is constructed as the by-product of the clinical gaze. Users of mental health services have 
typically experienced both epistemic injustices (in the denial of their own account of their 
experiences) and more direct suspensions of their civil rights in the name of superior objective 
knowledge. Over the decades since the civil rights movements, as part of their wider struggle to be 
people rather than passive collections of symptoms, patients councils have been one of the tactics 
that users and survivors have successfully deployed to ensure that their accounts are considered 
alongside the versions of the psychiatric professionals (Survivors History Group, n.d.). By means of
patients councils, service users have reconstituted themselves from diagnosed ‘dividuals’ to 
collective actors whose opinions count. A very different historical example highlights the potential 
for people’s councils to turn complex technological system away from destructive ends. 
In 1976 a Combined Shop Stewards Committee made up of shop floor workers produced an 
alternative corporate plan for Lucas Aerospace that advocated the production of socially useful 
products instead of weapons (‘The Lucas Plan’, 2016).  Ideas prototyped by the workforce included 
heat pumps, solar cells, wind turbines and hybrid power packs for vehicles. The energy and 
determination of the popular committee were captured in a documentary made for the Open 
University in 1978 (Open University, 1978). While the management of the time rejected the plans, 
many of the ideas have become mainstream forms of sustainable technology. Patients councils and 
the Lucas committee are instances of face-to-face structures that restored fairness and a wider 
concern for wellbeing to technocratic and potentially toxic contexts. 
The risk that comes with the new powers of machine learning is that we become embedded in 
patterns that deepen harm. Nested deep learning systems will set up circulations and recursions, 
loops of self-justification where interventions in world modify the next wave of training data, 
reinforcing patterns and potential discriminations (Mackenzie, 2015). In her book ‘The Human 
Condition’ Hannah Arendt critiqued the instrumentalism and cycles of social reproduction that she 
saw as already characterising the industrial society of the post-war years. "If we see these processes 
against the background of human purposes, which have a willed beginning and a definite end, they 
assume the character of automatism. We call automatic all courses of movement which are self-
moving and therefore outside the range of willful and purposeful interference" (Arendt, 1998 p151).
In so-called AI we are introducing new processes which are self-moving and which partially evade 
purposeful interference.  Arendt’s critique of our world view reads as a diagnosis of machine 
learning, where “real relationships are dissolved into logical relations between man-made symbols”.
The ethical challenges we face don’t come from the substitution of humans by machines but from 
the computational extension of existing social tendencies. A society which uncritically absorbs 
machine learning deepens its automaticity. Arendt also pointed to people’s councils as historical 
spaces where these tendencies were inverted, and noted that they arise at times of urgent need (she 
referred to Hungary 1956 as an example contemporaneous with her book). In particular, she saw 
them as the renewal of face-to-face democracy and as spaces for ‘action’. In Arendt’s philosophy, 
action stands as the alternative to instrumentalism and thoughtless process. An action, for her, is 
fundamentally a beginning. "Man does not so much possess freedom as he, or better his coming into
the world, is equated with the appearance of freedom in the universe; man is free because he is a 
beginning...” (Arendt & Kohn, 2006). What she saw as action is exactly that the opposite to the 
patterns of life paradigm; action is the beginning which happens “against the overwhelming odds of
statistical laws and their probability” (Arendt, 1998, p. 178). Thus, to argue for people’s councils is 
not only to advocate for direct democracy in the social application of machine learning, but to 
reclaim spaces for ethical action from generalised thoughtlessness and automaticity. 
Conclusions
Dealing with the ethical consequences of machine learning is not a simple matter. We have seen that
the methods of machine learning are entangled with ethical side effects prior to their activation, 
through training data, during their development, through opacity, and in practice, through the 
assemblages of institutions and ideas that form around them. Academia and wider society have laid 
down ethical principles as a way to ward off a repeat of bitter historical events, but it certainly 
seems that these will be eroded by uncertainties about consent, harm and even what constitutes a 
human subject. Unconstrained machine learning can become a drone perspective, a targeting gaze 
that blurs legality and divides the social along decision boundaries of ‘us and them’. How this can 
be counterbalanced is an open question; this paper proposes the model of people’s councils, 
horizontal and inclusive structures for democratic deliberation. The aim is to create structures where
those affected can contest machine decisions through the collective refusal of automaticity. 
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